Three weeks into the conflict and the devastating aftermath of the Swat Operations are on the forefront. The Lahore blast can easily be documented as a Prime Beginning into the retaliation by the Talibans.
Pakistan government had marshaled 15,000 troops into the swat valley to eliminate and annihilate the “existential threat” consuming the US war in Afghanistan.
Apparently, and for all reasons logically perceived, Pakistan had never been a part of the ongoing War on Terror, though there had been claim of Pakistan being a close ally of the US on the war, its actual participation had yet to be compromised. The Bush administration had tried its utmost tactics to indulge Pakistan with itself, yet their threatening attitude brought them no gain. On the contrary, the recent Obama administration, realizing the fact that Pakistan’s involvement is the certain key to its triumph in Afghanistan, sought to boisterously aid Pakistan and buys them into the bargain.
The onslaught by the Pakistan army in the Swat Valley is a prime war tactic profoundly utilized by large armies battling out insurgencies. The fleeing Afghan Talibans sought refuge in the North Frontier Province of Pakistan in the homes of their Pakhtun brothers who would help and aid them in their resurgence. The clan-brotherhood of the Pakhtuns is one of a kind in the world. Thus these lands were converted into rendezvous points and it was through these lands that the recent uprising of Taliban began.
The US having little access to these lands had no other option but to pile up pressure on the Pakistan government and force them into launching an assault
The end to the Swat Operation is as uncertain as its success or failure. Yet, the repercussions have started its toll. Pakistan risks greater backlash and further destabilization in the country. The Pakistan army may make short-term gains, but it risks increase terror-like attacks on more stable areas of eastern Pakistan. The very indiscriminate nature of military response may well be storing up resentment elsewhere and ability of Taliban-like-groups to quickly inflate in other areas as they are squeezed in Swat is of particular concern.
The Taliban and its allies will resort to increase terrorist attacks elsewhere in Pakistan and then there will be two questions left with Pakistan. One is whether the army and police can hold the territories it has conquered, and secondly – more questionably, will they go on to reconquer other areas on the Afghan Frontier (rendezvous points) as the US would like.
The only, materialistically viable solution for a long-term stability in Pakistan is dependant on the withdrawal of US forces from Afghanistan and not merely reinforcing Pakistan army and police and pumping in aid to undercut insurgency. It is the US presence in Afghanistan that is feeding the insurgency in Pakistan and eventually in Afghanistan.
